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HOW EAST ASIA COULD AMPLIFY ITS 
VOICE IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE 
Ross P. Buckley* 
Abstract: East Asia’s voice in global and economic governance is far 
smaller than it should be given the region’s contribution to world growth 
and its general significance. The region is under-represented, by any 
measure, on the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, and the Financial Stability Board. Only in the G20 
does the region have fair representation, but because it doesn’t speak 
with a unified voice, even there the region’s impact is limited. This article 
explores how regional nations might work together to rectify this situa-
tion and what keeps the region’s three largest economies apart on so 
many issues. In particular, the article explores how Japan needs to take re-
sponsibility for its history and understand the price it is paying for not do-
ing so. The article also contrasts China’s generally adroit use of aid, soft 
loans, and other measures to garner influence, with its highly counter-
productive belligerence over territorial claims in the South China and 
East China Seas. The article advances a thesis that might explain this 
‘split-personality’ behavior by China, why in some fora its behavior is sub-
tle and highly effective in attaining its national interests, yet when it 
comes to territoriality issues it behaves utterly differently and in ways quite 
adverse to its larger agenda. 
Introduction 
 The globalization of the international financial and economic sys-
tems necessitates stronger organs of international economic govern-
ance.1 The architecture crafted by White and Keynes at Bretton Woods 
in 1944 was designed to promote international trade and keep finance 
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1 See infra notes 2–12 and accompanying text. 
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national.2 The globalization of finance, which commenced in the 1970s 
with the dismantling of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates, began to change all that.3 The globalization of production com-
pleted the transformation of our world from separate but intercon-
nected national markets, to, in many areas, a series of global markets.4 
These truly profound changes required greater coordination and regu-
lation of these global markets and so over time an alphabet soup of or-
ganizations was established or expanded to fulfill these roles.5 These 
include: the Group of Seven (G7),6 Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS),7 Financial Stability Forum (FSF),8 International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO),9 Basel Committee on Banking Su-
                                                                                                                      
2 A.M. Endres, Great Architects of International Finance: The Bretton Woods 
Era 2, 18–19 (2005); International Economic Law: The State and Future of the Dis-
cipline 1 (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008); Douglas W. Arner & Ross P. Buckley, Redesigning 
the Architecture of the Global Financial System, 11 Melb. J. Int’l L. 185, 188 (2010). 
3 See Arner & Buckley, supra note 2, at 188–96. See generally Samuel Knafo, The Gold 
Standard and the Origins of the Modern International Monetary System, 13 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 
78 (2006)(explaining an interest in international monetary cooperation contributed to 
the creation of the Bretton Woods system). 
4 See Sven W. Arndt, Globalization and the Gains from Trade, in Trade, Growth, and 
Economic Policy in Open Economies 3, 4–5, 12 (Karl-Josef Koch & Klaus Jaeger eds., 
1998); Serghei Margulescu & Elena Margulescu, Switching from the Globalization of Markets to 
the Globalization of Production and Services in a Semiglobalized World, 16 Lex et Scientia Int’l 
J. 388, 388 (2009). 
5 See infra notes 6–12 and accompanying text. 
6 Group of Seven–G-7, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/g7.asp 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2013). The Group of Seven (G7) was formed in 1975 as a forum of the 
world’s seven most industrialized economies: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Id. The G7 expanded to become the G8 when 
Russia joined in 1998. Id. Officials from the G8 member states meet annually to discuss 
international economic issues. See The G-8, Summit D’Evian 2003, http://www.g8.fr/ 
evian/english/navigation/the_g8/questions_about_the_g8.html#question1 (last visited Nov. 
22, 2013). 
7 About BIS, Bank for Int’l Settlements, http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2013)(“The mission of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is to 
serve central banks in their pursuit of monetary and financial stability, to foster interna-
tional cooperation in those areas and to act as a bank for central banks.”). 
8 About the FSB History, Fin. Stability Board, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ 
about/history.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was 
established by the G7 in 1999 and aimed to bring together national authorities responsible 
for financial stability in significant international financial centres. Id. In April 2009 the FSF 
was re-established as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) by the leaders of the G20, who 
expanded the organization’s membership and mandate to further promote financial sta-
bility. Id. 
9 About IOSCO, Int’l Org. Securities Comm’ns, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2013). The International Organization of Securities Commissions was es-
tablished in 1983 as a global standards setter for the securities sector. Id. 
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pervision,10 International Accounting Standards Board,11 and Interna-
tional Association of Insurance Supervisors.12 
 Until 2009 the lead role in global economic governance was exer-
cised by the G7 grouping of nations, in which Japan was the only Asian 
member.13 With the advent of the global financial crisis in 2008, it 
quickly became apparent that the G7 nations did not have the moral 
authority, or the right nations at the table, to craft a credible response 
to the crisis. In response, the G7 resolved to pass its role on to the 
Group of Twenty (G20),14 a pre-existing meeting of Finance Ministers 
that was promptly upgraded to a heads of government meeting.15 The 
G20 grouping includes all members of the G7 plus China, Indonesia, 
and Korea, as well as other developing nations including Brazil, India, 
and South Africa. 
 So for the first time, of late, East Asia had four representatives 
seated at the high table of economic governance: Japan, China, Indo-
nesia, and Korea; five given the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) is usually extended an invitation to participate; and seven if 
one includes Australia and India as Asian nations. Even though India is 
indubitably Asian and Australia is arguably so from an economic per-
spective, this article focuses upon East Asia rather than the region more 
broadly conceived. 
 Although global economic governance is in the G20 politicians’ 
hands, global financial governance is managed by the technocrats of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank for International Set-
                                                                                                                      
10 About the Basel Committee, Bank for Int’l Settlements, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ 
about.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS, formerly known as the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Prac-
tices) is the main global standard-setter for the prudential regulation of banks. Id. 
11 About the IFRS Foundation and the IASB, IFRS Found., http://www.ifrs.org/The-
organisation/Pages/IFRS-Foundation-and-the-IASB.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). The 
International Accounting Standards Board is the standard setting board of the IFRS Foun-
dation, an independent private sector organization responsible for the development of 
international financial reporting standards. Id. 
12 Int’l Ass’n Ins. Supervisors, http://www.iaisweb.org (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors was established in 1994 to promote 
effective and globally consistent supervision of the insurance industry. Id. 
13 See Daniel Bradlow, A Framework for Assessing Global Economic Governance, 54 B.C. L. 
Rev. 971, 975; Group of Seven–G-7, Investopedia, supra note 6. 
14 See About the G20, Global Partnership for Fin. Inclusion, http://www.gpfi.org/ 
about-gpfi/countries/about-g20 (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). The G20 was established in 
the late 1990s in recognition of the fact that key emerging market countries were not in-
cluded in the G7. Id.; see also Bradlow, supra note 13, at 975–76. 
15 Arner & Buckley, supra note 2, at 207–08. 
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tlements (BIS), and Financial Stability Board (FSB).16 Yet East Asia 
lacks adequate representation in each of these bodies.17 Even after the 
reallocation of voting rights in the IMF in 2010–11, the ten Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations18 plus China, Japan, and Korea possess only 
17.59 percent of the total votes available to be cast,19 whereas these thir-
teen nations generate 24.56 percent of global gross domestic product 
(GDP).20 
 There are sixty member central banks of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, yet only nine originate from East Asia (China, Hong 
Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singa-
pore, and Thailand).21 Further, although the BIS Board consists of 
nineteen members, only two are from East Asia, both from Japan.22 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Bradlow, supra note 13, at 975–79; About BIS, supra note 7; About the FSB History, 
supra note 8; About the IMF, Int’l Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/ 
about.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was estab-
lished in 1945 and today has a membership of 188 countries. See id. Its main purpose is to 
contribute to international financial stability. See id. 
17 See infra notes 8–26 and accompanying text. 
18 ASEAN Member States, Ass’n Southeast Asian Nations, http://www.asean.org/ 
asean/asean-member-states (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). The ASEAN Member States in-
clude Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philip-
pines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. Id. 
19 See IMF Executive Board Approves Major Overhaul of Quotas and Governance, Int’l 
Monetary Fund (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10418. 
htm; IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power, Int’l Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx#2 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). Japan has 6.23% and 
China 3.81% of the votes. Id. 
20 See The World Factbook Field Listing: GDP (Official Exchange Rate), Cent. Intelligence 
Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2013). The Gross World Product is US$71.83 trillion and the GDP of 
the ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea is US$17.643527 trillion. See id. 
21 Organisation and Governance, Bank for Int’l Settlements, http://www.bis.org/ 
about/orggov.htm (last updated July 29, 2013). In relation to voting shares, the BIS web-
site states that “The BIS currently has 60 member central banks, all of which are entitled to 
be represented and vote in the General Meetings. Voting power is proportionate to the 
number of BIS shares issued in the country of each member represented at the meeting.” 
Id. 
22 See About BIS: Board of Directors, Bank for Int’l Settlements, http://www.bis.org/ 
about/board.htm (last updated July 1, 2013). The Board at the time of writing comprised: 
Christian Noyer, Paris (Chairman); Ben S Bernanke, Washington, DC; Mark Carney, Lon-
don; Agustín Carstens, Mexico City; Luc Coene, Brussels; Andreas Dombret, Frankfurt am 
Main; Mario Draghi, Frankfurt am Main; William C Dudley, New York; Stefan Ingves, 
Stockholm; Thomas Jordan, Zurich; Klaas Knot, Amsterdam; Haruhiko Kuroda, Tokyo; 
Fabio Panetta, Rome; Stephen S Poloz, Ottawa; Baron Guy Quaden, Brussels; Paul Tucker, 
London; Ignazio Visco, Rome; Jens Weidmann, Frankfurt am Main; and Zhou Xiaochuan, 
Beijing. See id. 
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 The Financial Standards Board (FSB) has fifty-two seats on it for 
nations and eighteen for organizations, totaling seventy seats.23 Yet 
China has three seats; Hong Kong one; Indonesia one; Japan three; 
Korea two; and Singapore one—giving East Asia as a region only eleven 
seats.24 Article 10(1) of the FSB Charter, however, provides that the 
number of the seats in the Plenary (the decision-making body of the 
FSB) “reflects the size of the national economy, financial market activity 
and national financial stability arrangements of the corresponding 
Member jurisdiction.”25 Nevertheless, East Asia’s representation fails to 
come close to this, at least in terms of the sizes of the national econo-
mies.26 
 Therefore, it is only in the G20 that East Asia’s representation 
equals its economic heft—the region has 20 percent of the seats (i.e. 
four seats out of twenty) and 24.56 percent of global GDP.27 Further-
more, the pattern has become to invite the Chairperson of ASEAN to 
G20 summits to represent ASEAN’s position on issues.28 The ASEAN 
Chair was first invited to the summit in London in 2009,29 and has been 
invited to all subsequent summits.30 ASEAN is pushing for a formal seat 
at the G20, rather than relying on ad hoc invitations from the nation 
hosting the relevant G20 summit, but a permanent seat for ASEAN has 
                                                                                                                      
23 See Members of the Financial Stability Board, Fin. Stability Board (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/plenary.pdf. 
24 Id. 
25 Fin. Stability Board, Charter of the Financial Stability Board art. 11 ( June 
2012), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120809.pdf. 
26 See id.; The World Factbook Field Listing: GDP (Official Exchange Rate), supra note 20 and 
accompanying text. 
27 See About the G20, supra note 14; The World Factbook Field Listing: GDP (Official Exchange 
Rate), supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
29 Giovanni Capannelli, Asian Regionalism: How Does it Compare to Europe’s?, E. Asia Fo-
rum (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/21/asian-regionalism-how-
does-it-compare-to-europes. 
30 For attendance at both 2009 summits see Pradumna B. Rana, How Can Asia 
Strengthen Its Voice at the G20?, E. Asia Forum (June 29, 2010), http://www.eastasiaforum. 
org/2010/06/29/how-can-asia-strengthen-its-voice-at-the-g20. For attendance at both 2010 
summits see Chair of ASEAN, President SBY of Indonesia Invites Members of G20 to Join ASEAN 
in Search of Lasting Solutions to Global Challenges, ASEAN (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.asean. 
org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/chair-of-asean-president-sby-of-indonesia-invites-mem- 
bers-of-g20-to-join-asean-in-search-of-lasting-solutions-to-global-challenges. For 2011 atten-
dance see Rodolfo C. Severino, Cambodia Hosts First East Asian Summit for 2012, E. Asia 
Forum (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/ 2012/04/27/cambodia-hosts-the-
first-asean-summit-for-2012. For 2012 attendance see Cambodian PM Heads for Mexico to 
Attend G20 Summit, Global Times ( June 16, 2012), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/ 
715285.shtml. 
24 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:19 
not yet been institutionalised.31 Provided this materializes, or the tradi-
tion of ad hoc invitations continues, East Asia will have 24 percent of the 
representatives at G20 meetings, which means the region’s representa-
tion very nearly equals its contribution to global GDP.32 
 The G20 is the primary body directing global economic and finan-
cial regulation—a role it has been given by the G7.33 The G20 often 
directs the activities of the more technical bodies like the IMF or the 
FSB.34 In this sense, if East Asia had been able to choose just one organ 
of global governance on which to have fair representation it could not 
have done better than to choose the G20. The G20 is certainly the re-
gion’s best chance to play a major role in global economic governance. 
This article examines what stands between the region and it playing 
that sort of role. 
 The next section explores the history of how our international sys-
tem grew to where it is today and argues that the relatively recent rise of 
East Asia calls for a recalibrating of the system. Section II explores the 
four reasons why East Asia has had relatively little input into global gov-
ernance (including the absence of East Asian unity arising, in part, 
from the heavy hand of Japan’s history). Section III analyses the extent 
of integration within East Asia today, and Section IV considers the ad-
vantages of a unified regional voice in global governance. Section V 
considers the recent change in China’s foreign policy and the massive 
price China is paying for it, including lost opportunities for regional 
leadership and regional cohesion. Section VI concludes. 
I. History and Background 
 Historically, East Asia enjoyed only a very minor role in global 
economic and financial governance.35 Sixty years ago, in terms of its 
                                                                                                                      
31 See Hugo Dobson, The G20: Engine of Asian Regionalism? 7 (German Inst. of Global & 
Asian Stud., Working Paper No. 179, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1973062; Andrew F. Cooper, The Group of Twenty: Input and Output 
Legitimacy, Reforms, and Agenda 16 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 372, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.eaber.org/sites/default/files/documents/2012.08.08.wp372.g20.input_ 
output.legitimacy. reforms.agenda.pdf. 
32 See About the G20, supra note 14; The World Factbook Field Listing: GDP (Official Exchange 
Rate), supra note 20; Dobson, supra note 31; Cooper, supra note 31. 
33 See Bradlow, supra note 13, at 975. 
34 See id. at 977–78. 
35 Ross P. Buckley, The Rise of China and Its Impact on International Economic Governance, 
in Shifting Global Powers & International Law 50, 52 (Rowena Maguire et al. eds., 
2013). 
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economic significance and influence, this made some sense.36 Today, 
however, it does not. For decades, East Asian nations have charted their 
own economic course and enjoyed extraordinary growth that has un-
derpinned global growth.37 For over twenty years China has grown at 
an average rate above 9 percent38 that has recently decreased to about 
7.6 percent;39 Malaysia has grown at an average rate of above six per-
cent; Singapore at above 7 percent; and South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Thailand at well over 5 percent.40 When Japan was outperforming the 
world, from 1950 to 1965, its economy expanded on average at over 10 
percent per annum.41 
 China is the second largest economy in the world in purchasing 
power parity terms—the terms that economists generally accept as best 
for comparative purposes.42 Even more impressively, China is the sec-
ond largest economy in unadjusted U.S. dollar terms.43 China holds 
about 30 percent, Japan about 15 percent, and South Korea about 3 
percent of worldwide official foreign currency reserves.44 China and 
Japan have long been the principal buyers of United States Treasury 
                                                                                                                      
36 Id. 
37 See infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
38 Wayne M. Morrison, Cong. Research Serv., RL33534, China’s Economic Con-
ditions 4–5 (2012). 
39 Ian Johnson, China’s Growth Rate Slowed in the 2nd Quarter, N.Y. Times ( July 12, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/business/global/chinas-growth-rate-slowed-
in-the-2nd-quarter-down-sharply-from-a-year-ago.html. For a highly insightful analysis of 
how China is now pursuing more equitable and sustainable development in a quest for 
social peace and stability, see Chin Leng Lim, China’s State-Centric Model of Steered Eco-
nomic Liberalization, Paper presented at the Conference on European and Global Eco-
nomic Governance, Brussels, (Feb. 2011). 
40 See GDP Growth (Annual%), The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (data table is divided in to increments of 
five years spanning 1980–2012); see also World Economic Outlook Database, Int’l Monetary 
Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx (last vis-
ited Nov. 22, 2013). 
41 See Ken Bieda, The Structure and Operation of the Japanese Economy 12 
(1970). 
42 See World Economic Outlook Database, supra note 40 (follow “By Countries (country-
level data)” hyperlink; then follow “All countries” hyperlink; then follow “Continue” hyper-
link; then select “Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) share of 
world total: Percent” and follow “Continue” hyperlink; the follow “Prepare Report” hyper-
link). 
43 See World Economic Outlook Database, supra note 40 (follow “By Countries (country-
level data)” hyperlink; then follow “All countries” hyperlink; then follow “Continue” hyper-
link; then select “Gross Domestic Product, Current Prices: U.S. Dollars” and follow “Con-
tinue” hyperlink; the follow “Prepare Report” hyperlink). 
44 Buckley, supra note 35, at 52. 
26 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:19 
bonds.45 The Chinese and Japanese have saved and lent, so Americans 
can borrow and spend.46 China has been assisted in amassing these re-
serves, in my view, by keeping its currency,47 until recently, significantly 
undervalued.48 Although China may well have been manipulating the 
value of its currency, it nevertheless did so without breaching its obliga-
tions under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF or the various WTO 
treaties.49 
 The path to development promoted by the International Mone-
tary Fund, World Bank and United States Treasury is a bundle of poli-
cies generally known as the Washington Consensus.50 The focus of 
these policies has been to grow the debtor’s economy, to alleviate pov-
erty within the country, and thus, to generate sufficient foreign ex-
change resources to stay current on its debts.51 It has been taken as 
axiomatic that higher growth rates lead to less poverty, and that the 
road to higher growth involves devaluing exchange rates, reducing 
                                                                                                                      
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See Roya Wolverson & Christopher Alessi, Confronting US-China Economic Imbalances, 
Council on Foreign Rel. (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/china/confronting-us-china- 
economic-imbalances/p20758#p3. There is a vigorous debate on whether China has manipu-
lated the value of the yuan (which it steadfastly denies) and on whether the yuan has long 
been undervalued. See id. 
48 See Esther Fung & Shen Hong, China Widens Yuan Trading Band vs. Dollar, Wall St. 
J. (Apr. 14, 2012, 7:23 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023044 
44604577342580742454656. In mid-2010 China ended the freeze of the yuan against the 
US dollar and began to allow a gradual change in the value of the yuan. See id. In April 
2012 the government accelerated this process. See id. The International Monetary Fund 
has of late revised its position on the renminbi, calling the currency “moderately under-
valued” —a shift from its earlier consistent position that the renminbi was substantially 
undervalued. The Fund said China’s shrinking trade surplus and the renminbi’s apprecia-
tion in recent years meant that it was now closer to fair value. Compare Int’l Monetary 
Fund, People’s Republic of China 2012 Article IV Consultation, 20, IMF Country Report No. 
12/195 ( July 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12195. 
pdf, with Int’l Monetary Fund, People’s Republic of China 2012 Article IV Consultation, 18, IMF 
Country Report No. 11/192 ( July 2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/scr/2011/cr11192.pdf. 
49 Bryan Mercurio & Celine Sze Ning Leung, Is China a “Currency Manipulator”?: The 
Legitimacy of China’s Exchange Regime Under the Current International Legal Framework, 43 Int’l 
Law. 1257, 1257 (2009). 
50 See Buckley, supra note 35, at 50. The term “Washington Consensus” was coined in 
1989 by John Williamson, a British economist. See id.; A Conversation with John Williamson, 
Economist, Wash. Post (Apr. 12, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2009/04/09/AR2009040903241.html. 
51 See Alfredo Saad-Filho, Life Beyond the Washington Consensus: An Introduction to Pro-poor 
Macroeconomic Policies, 19 Rev. Pol. Econ. 513, 521–22 (2007); see also Hossein Askari, 
Third World Debt and Financial Innovation: The Experiences of Chile and Mex-
ico 21–22 (1991). 
2014] How East Asia Could Amplify Its Voice in Global Economic Governance 27 
budget deficits, charging more for state-produced goods and services, 
such as electricity and water, privatizing state-owned companies, and 
deregulating the labour market.52 In summary, the Washington Con-
sensus calls for a much-reduced role for government and a much-
increased role for markets.53 
 Diverse policies have been pursued by different East Asian nations, 
so the region’s economic success doesn’t present a simple story. This is 
especially so because China is keenly developing a very distinctive eco-
nomic model that contrasts starkly from the Washington Consensus.54 
Whereas Japan and Korea like to believe that they follow a Western 
economic model, in actuality they both favour far larger roles for gov-
ernment than the Washington Consensus would permit.55 Thus, the 
policies that have served the region so well often contradict those of 
the Washington Consensus. This is self-evidently true in China,56 but 
even Japan has consistently preferred regulatory approaches “that 
[rein] in rather than [let] loose market forces.”57 Indeed, the only East 
Asian economy to consistently follow Washington Consensus policies 
has been Hong Kong (treated as a separate economy for these pur-
poses).58 
 Other nations should be grateful that China and the other East 
Asian nations have consistently ignored IMF advice and Washington 
Consensus policies, and taken their own paths, because for decades the 
stellar economic growth of East Asia has lifted that of the world.59 In 
contrast, Washington Consensus policies have never worked this well in 
the countries in which they have been applied.60 China’s capacity to 
produce manufactured goods, clothing, and other items ever more ef-
ficiently and cheaply has kept a lid on inflationary pressures in virtually 
                                                                                                                      
52 Buckley, supra note 35, at 50; see Saad-Filho, supra note 51, at 521–24. 
53 Ross P. Buckley, The Economic Policies of China, India and the Washington Consensus: An 
Enlightening Comparison, 27 Wis. Int’l L. J. 707, 711–12 (2010). 
54 See Buckley, supra note 35, at 54. 
55 See id. at 51. 
56 See Jayati Ghosh, China and India: The Big Differences, Int’l Dev. Econ. Assoc. (Aug. 
25, 2005), http://www.networkideas.org/news/aug2005/print/prnt250805_China_India. 
htm. As recently as 2004, state-owned enterprises accounted for over 50 percent of China’s 
GDP and over 40 percent of its exports. See id. 
57 Phillip Lipscy, Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal, 3 Stan. J. E. Asian Aff. 93, 100 
(2003). 
58 Buckley, supra note 35, at 51. 
59 See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
60 Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?, 44 J. Econ. 
Literature 973, 973–74 (2006). 
28 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:19 
all developed economies.61 For Australia, Brazil, and other commodi-
ties exporters China’s growth has provided a massive market for miner-
als and other commodities.62 Indeed, the rise of East Asia generally has 
underpinned global prosperity for the past twenty-five years.63 
 In finance, China has marched to the beat of its own drummer, 
choosing the cadence to suit itself.64 For the past twenty years, the 
European Union and the United States have been pushing for China to 
open up more to their banking institutions, to allow in foreign capital, 
and to allow the renminbi to float on international markets.65 China, 
however, has resisted most of these demands.66 Foreign banks have 
been allowed in when, and on the terms, that best suited China, and 
only in limited ways.67 Foreign capital has been allowed in only in lim-
ited and tightly controlled ways so that longer-term investments in 
businesses are welcomed but short-term hot money flows are denied 
access.68 
 In the Holy Trinity of international finance one doesn’t get all 
three. In Christianity the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit are three as-
pects in effect of a singular Godhead. International finance, in more 
ways than just this, is more like Meatloaf—the singer, not the meal. One 
of his more popular songs is entitled, “Two out of Three Ain’t Bad.”69 
In international finance, a country can have two out of three of: (i) ac-
cess to international capital markets, (ii) control of interest rates, or 
(iii) control of exchange rate.70 But it cannot have all three.71 In other 
words, if you need foreign capital, then you can set your interest rates 
but the market will set your exchange rates (as Australia and the United 
States do).72 Or you can set your exchange rates, but the market will set 
your interest rates. But you cannot set both interest and exchange rates 
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if you need foreign capital because then you typically won’t get the 
capital in the amounts you need.73 
 This is one of the reasons China has so tightly controlled the entry 
of foreign capital.74 By preventing itself from becoming dependent 
upon foreign capital, China has managed to stay in charge of both its 
interest and exchange rates, and thus retain control of two very power-
ful policy levers over its economy.75 Keeping interest rates artificially 
low for decades has preferred Chinese manufacturers and other indus-
tries that benefit from access to cheap capital, at the expense of Chi-
nese citizens, who receive very low returns on their savings.76 And by 
keeping its currency artificially undervalued it prefers Chinese export 
industries again over Chinese consumers, who have to pay higher prices 
for imported goods than would be the case were the exchange rates at 
an appropriate value.77 
 So in the financial sphere China has consistently called the shots in 
terms of its interaction with the global financial system.78 Yet, to date, 
China, and East Asia more broadly, have punched well below their 
weight in shaping international financial governance. China has been 
happy to interact on its terms with global capital without taking the 
next step of becoming heavily engaged in how the global financial sys-
tem is structured and regulated. 
II. Why East Asia Has Had Little Input into Global Governance 
 Four principal reasons explain why East Asia’s input into global 
governance has not matched its economic performance: 
  1. The economic rise of East Asia is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon, which is yet to move the massive inertia in inter-
national governance arrangements. 
  2. Regional discord prevents East Asia from speaking with a 
unified voice at G20, BIS, FSB, and other governance body 
meetings. 
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  3. The United States has actively worked to discourage re-
gional co-operation. 
  4. The region has not really trusted international institutions 
and their policies. 
A. Inertia in Global Governance Arrangements 
 The first reason needs little explanation—the present leaders in 
economic governance do not want to cede their power to emerging 
East Asian powerhouses.79 Power in international affairs is attractive, 
nations do not like ceding it once they have it, and power sharing is a 
zero sum game—more influence and power for East Asian nations 
means less for other nations.80 Across the board, Europe is the region 
that is over-represented in membership entitlements at the IMF, the 
G20, and the various international financial regulatory bodies.81 Thus, 
any push for greater representation for East Asia (and developing na-
tions more generally) almost inevitably requires Europe to give up 
some of its power.82 For instance, European nations hold eighteen seats 
on the FSB, whereas East Asia has only eleven seats.83 Furthermore, the 
European Central Bank and European Commission each hold an or-
ganisational seat on the FSB, while no distinctively Asian organisation 
sits on the Board.84 So Europe enjoys almost double the representation 
of East Asia on the FSB while producing roughly the same proportion 
of global GDP.85 
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B. The Absence of Unity Among East Asian Nations 
 East Asia is not a cohesive region.86 Its nations are divided by relig-
ions, political systems, degrees of development, and historical distrust.87 
Some of the region’s nations reject religion while others embrace Bud-
dhism, Christianity, and Islam.88 Some nations embrace communism 
while promoting free markets; some are democracies with heightened 
government influence over industry, such as Japan, Korea and Singa-
pore; and others are laissez faire free market democracies, such as 
Hong Kong.89 Some nations are highly developed, such as Japan and 
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Singapore; some are desperately underdeveloped, such as Myanmar 
and Laos; and others, such as China, have pockets of both stages of de-
velopment.90 
 The road to the degree of unity seen today in Europe has been 
long and tortuous, yet Europe shares a common religion, political sys-
tem, and degree of development.91 The principal divisive factor in 
Europe has been historical distrust.92 East Asia has a much steeper road 
to climb on the path to unity with deep divisions in religion, political 
systems, and levels of development, and with at least as much historical 
distrust due to past wars and conflicts as Europe had.93 
 Allied to this is the fact that the idea of Asia or East Asia is yet to 
gain as much traction as the idea of Europe had acquired even by the 
late 1960s.94 Asia is not a term one hears used regularly to identify the 
region.95 Actors within the region are far more likely to speak of other 
nations specifically, rather than of the region as a grouping. Asia and 
East Asia are terms used more often by outsiders to define and limit the 
region than by those living within it to engender feelings of camarade-
rie and a shared future.96 
 Regional unity is frustrated because the hand of history impairs 
the trust necessary to form regional relations.97 The general perception 
in the region is that Japan has never properly apologised nor taken re-
sponsibility for the atrocities it committed during its imperial period, 
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spanning 1895 to 1945.98 This view is most strongly held by China, 
whose people suffered grievous atrocities by the Japanese, such as the 
Rape of Nanking.99 Reconciliation between China and Japan is essen-
tial for the development of a regional architecture, as Simon Tay has 
pointed out, yet China and Japan are in no sense natural allies.100 
Nonetheless, reconciliation is needed, and for it to occur, “Japan must 
come to terms with its history”.101 This is a difficult challenge for Japan 
given its domestic politics.102 Extreme right wing elements within its 
body politic who wish to argue that the rape of Nanking never hap-
pened will always receive disproportionate media coverage in places 
like China; as will Japanese school texts that choose to portray Japan as 
a victim in World War II rather than an aggressor.103 Recognizing past 
wrongdoing is a difficult challenge for Japan, but it is one to which it 
simply must rise—for its own sake, most of all, and for the region’s. 
 Korea has its own similar sources of historical distrust with Japan, 
most prominently Japan’s enslavement of Korean women to serve as 
prostitutes (the euphemistically termed “comfort women”) for Japa-
nese soldiers in World War II and Japan’s continuing refusal to com-
pensate the women.104 These painful wounds were recently reopened 
when the Mayor of Osaka said, “For soldiers who risked their lives in 
circumstances where bullets are flying around like rain and wind, if you 
want them to get some rest a comfort women system was necessary. 
That’s clear to anyone.”105 Although the mayor of a major city has of 
course no foreign policy role or official voice on these matters, and 
doubtless this man was playing to some misguided domestic audience, 
his ridiculous utterances nonetheless reverberated throughout the re-
gion in ways severely damaging to Japan’s soft power and to prospects 
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for regional unity.106 Somehow, Japan, in so many ways such a deeply 
civilized nation, needs to engineer a national dialogue that will pro-
duce an enlightened, accurate consensus upon its history. 
 The cause of East Asian unity is further held back by the absence 
of a clear regional leader.107 Until a decade ago, the obvious economic 
leader of the region was Japan, but the aforementioned distrust limited 
its capacity to play this role.108 Moreover, Japan tended to keep its dis-
tance in regional councils, playing the role of a somewhat aloof devel-
oped nation in a developing region.109 Today the economic leader of 
the region is China, but Japan remains unwilling to concede this role, 
and instead, the two nations continue to jostle each other for regional 
leadership.110 
 In this regard it is time for Japan to face reality and accept that 
China’s economic growth has placed it into an unassailable position of 
regional leadership.111 Japan needs to conceive of a regional future in 
which it can exercise leadership in coalition with other regional na-
tions, or in coalition with China, and accept that the days when it was 
reasonable for Japan to expect to act as the region’s sole leader are 
long behind it. 
C. The U.S. Works Actively to Discourage Regional Co-operation 
 The United States has not historically seen a unified East Asia as 
being in its national interest.112 It has therefore worked in more and 
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less subtle ways against regional unity and co-operation.113 For instance, 
when Japan proposed, and was willing to fund, an Asian Monetary 
Fund in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, the United States strongly op-
posed the idea, principally because this fund could have led to far 
greater regional co-operation.114 
 In the words of Frank Jannuzi, “In the 1990s, the United States 
thwarted early steps toward building an East Asia economic community, 
fearing a diminution in U.S. influence.”115 More recently, however, as 
the region has progressed along a road towards regional community 
building, the United States has come to realise that it best get on the 
bus and encourage regional unity, or risk being left behind.116 As a re-
sult, America’s attitude towards East Asian regionalism is becoming far 
less antagonistic than it was one or two decades ago, but it still doesn’t 
actively support the process.117 
D. East Asia’s Historical Distrust of International Institutions 
 Perhaps the principal contemporary reason for East Asia’s general 
skepticism about global economic governance is the region’s deep disil-
lusionment with the intervention of the IMF in the Asian crisis in 1997 
and 1998.118 The IMF’s high-handedness in imposing stringent condi-
tions on Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand was perceived as a humiliating 
affront to sovereignty, and it still looms large in the region’s collective 
memory.119 This is particularly so because the IMF’s initial diagnosis of 
Asia’s troubles in 1997 was quite wrong, as even the IMF itself was 
forced to admit in under two years.120 The strongly interventionist and 
directive style of the IMF in that crisis was in direct contrast to the re-
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gion’s strong preference for consensus-led cooperation, and so the re-
gion remains deeply distrustful of global economic institutions.121 Be 
that as it may, this historical distrust impairs the region’s opportunity to 
shape the global debate and the resulting regulatory measures. The 
time has come for the region to rise above its history and to start to play 
the role which its economic success has earned it and which will serve it 
best. After all, it is not as if China is content with the international fi-
nancial system as it is.122 The Governor of China’s central bank has 
been calling since 2009 for a new reserve currency regime, and China is 
hard at work bringing this to pass.123 China has entered into currency 
swap agreements with Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea to facilitate trade with those 
countries being denominated in their local currencies or renminbi, 
rather than U.S. dollars.124 As a result of these agreements and their 
projected expansion in the future, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank-
ing Corporation predicts that by 2015 some $2 trillion of Chinese trade 
could be settled in renminbi, which would make it one of the three 
leading currencies for the conduct of international trade.125 China re-
mains of the view that there are better alternatives for a global reserve 
currency than the U.S. dollar, with which I agree,126 and if it could 
bring all of East Asia with it in that view, it would have a far better pros-
pect of one day seeing it realised.127 
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III. Regional Integration 
 Integration within East Asia is an odd phenomenon. The region’s 
production is highly integrated—China acts primarily as the manufac-
turing hub, receiving inputs from other nations’ niche industries of 
comparative advantage.128 East Asia’s formal trade is also well inte-
grated with a veritable noodle bowl of bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements in place or under negotiation.129 Yet the region is poorly 
integrated in financial and political terms.130 The financial systems of 
most East Asian nations are far more closely integrated with financial 
systems in North America or Europe than with those of other East 
Asian nations.131 This is perplexing given the high savings rates and 
foreign exchange reserves that characterize regional nations.132 East 
Asia’s massive savings as a region give it more enviable options in deal-
ing with global capital and provide the opportunity to interact with 
global capital more on its own terms.133 
 Immediately after the East Asian crisis in 1997, Japan offered to 
fund the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund, with a view to en-
hancing regional financial integration.134 Unfortunately, the United 
States and the IMF sternly opposed the idea, China failed to support 
the idea, and thus, it was dropped.135 In its place, the much less ambi-
tious Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)—a series of bilateral commitments by 
which regional nations committed to make bilateral swap arrangements 
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and security repurchase agreements available to each other in times of 
need—was pursued.136 
 The CMI was not called upon during the 2008 global crisis, with 
regional nations preferring to arrange extended credit lines from the 
United States Federal Reserve.137 In the face of this economic failure, 
the swap agreements were multilateralised in early 2009 and increased 
by $40 billion to $120 billion in an agreement known as the Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralised (CMIM).138 And in May 2012, the swap lines 
were doubled to $240 billion.139 China, Japan, and Korea provided 80 
percent of these commitments, with the balance contributed by ASEAN 
nations.140 
 Originally, nations without IMF programs only had access to 20 
percent of the amounts available under the CMIM.141 As IMF negotia-
tions are typically slow, 80 percent of the funds would not be available 
promptly—a problem when they are needed during a crisis.142 Never-
theless, the CMIM credit was conditioned upon an IMF program be-
cause the CMI lacked a surveillance capacity.143 This has now been 
remedied with a surveillance authority established, in Singapore, in 
2012.144 The immediately available amount, however, was only in-
creased to 30 percent of available funds, with a view to further increase 
the funds to 40 percent in 2014.145 
 Jayant Menon has noted that, 
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Asia’s recent doubling of its financial safety net looks impres-
sive. But it’s more icing than cake. It is, in fact, unusable . . . 
During 1997/98, some $40–60 billion in emergency liquidity 
was needed by each crisis-hit country. Yet, the original ASEAN 
members can access about $23 billion each, and only thirty 
percent of this without an IMF programme.146 
Menon is right. The amount of funds available under the CMIM need 
at least to be doubled and preferably tripled, and the limits on the 
availability of the funds radically altered before the CMIM will be a real 
substitute for credit lines from the United States Federal Reserve or the 
IMF in any future crisis.147 Although ASEAN and the region moves 
slowly, they nonetheless remain persistent, so achieving a CMIM of this 
size and ability to react swiftly is by no means unforeseeable.148 
 Achieving a series of substantial credit lines coupled with a legiti-
mate surveillance (and thus advice-giving) capacity creates a close 
equivalent to a monetary fund—in this case, an Asian Monetary 
Fund.149 If the CMIM’s credit lines were to be tripled, and the condi-
tions upon which they were to be made available determined entirely 
by the CMIM’s surveillance authority in Singapore, not the IMF, then 
the CMIM could begin to function like an Asian Monetary Fund.150 
This, in turn, would greatly enhance the region’s control of its econ-
omy and allow the region to insulate itself, to some extent, from the 
vagaries and volatility of global capital.151 
IV. The Need for a Unified Regional Voice in  
Global Governance 
 If East Asia is to exercise the influence commensurate with its for-
eign exchange reserves and contribution to global GDP, then China, 
Japan, and Korea need to cooperate.152 Yet, rather than cooperating, 
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the three countries repeatedly clash at G20 summits.153 For instance, at 
the G20 Finance Ministers meeting in Paris in February 2011, Korea 
and China argued over the internationalization of the renminbi.154 
And at the G20 seminar in Nanjing in late March 2011, Japan advo-
cated the U.S. dollar’s continuance as the global reserve currency in 
direct opposition to China’s wishes. 155 
 The three countries’ economies, however, have much in com-
mon.156 Their public finances are healthy, their banking systems and 
corporate balance sheets are less stressed than most Western countries, 
and their huge foreign exchange reserves serve as potent insurance 
against external shocks.157 They also share a common perspective on 
the appropriate role of governments in directing economic activities.158 
Their domestic economic policy settings are strongly pro-business with 
relatively meager social welfare safety nets and their policies generally 
prefer domestic businesses over consumers through a mix of low inter-
est rates on savings and high tariffs on imports.159 Further, all three na-
tions rely upon export-led models of growth.160 Regional trade has 
been growing rapidly and is at an all-time high.161 40 percent of China’s 
exports are to Asia, as are 68 percent of Indonesia’s exports, 66 percent 
of Malaysia’s, and 55 percent of Korea’s.162 
 This relative economic strength and stability should give rise to 
considerable economic clout for the region in G20 deliberations, but 
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for this to happen, the region needs to speak with one voice.163 The two 
principal reasons it has yet do so are: (1) the lingering, potent historical 
animosities between China and Japan, and Korea and Japan, respec-
tively, and (2) Japan and Korea’s concern about China’s military rise 
and increasing bellicosity. 
 Thus, the onus is on Japan and China to act. As Japan was previ-
ously mentioned, the focus now turns to China. 
V. China’s Change of Course 
 For twenty years China’s foreign relations policies were primarily a 
model of the subtle but effective pursuit of national self-interest.164 In 
the past few years, all this has changed. 
 For years, in classes about the region, I would contrast the use by 
Japan and China of aid funds to secure influence. Every year Japan 
would heavily outspend China on regional aid, and yet achieve far less 
bang for their yen.165 Japan funded worthy projects that gave its 
neighbours what Japan believed they needed, and what they often did 
need.166 China, on the other hand, gave what recipient governments 
wanted.167 It was as if Japan was the parent who knew best and China 
the grandparent who bought soft toys and ice cream. 
 As the developed nation in East Asia, Japan acted as if it had 
earned the right to solve other nations’ problems. China behaved like a 
good friend who listened first and then helped. In the words of Diane 
Mauzy and Brian Job, “China’s attempts to woo Southeast Asia consist 
of a package of well crafted policies featuring economic incentives and 
goodwill measures along with a strong diplomatic effort.”168 Unsurpris-
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ingly, China won friends and influenced nations; whereas Japan spent a 
lot of money and did a lot of good, but not much for itself.169 
 There were tensions in these years, which diminished other na-
tions’ trust in China.170 These include: China’s “integration” of Tibet, 
China’s desire to reunify Taiwan with China, and China’s unsettled 
boundary dispute with India.171 However, it is fair to say that China’s 
star was on the ascent as a potential regional leader. All this started to 
change in the past few years with the rise of Chinese bellicosity.172 
 China is pushing its claims to islands in the South China and East 
China Seas, and few in the West draw distinctions between these 
claims.173 They tend to be seen as undifferentiated acts of Chinese ag-
gression. China’s perspective is utterly different. 
 China is pushing its claim to the Spratly Islands in the South China 
Sea vigorously against the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and 
Brunei—all of whom maintain claims to at least some of the islands.174 
A quick look at a map shows the validity of the Philippines’, and per-
haps Vietnam’s, claims to the Spratlys and the vast oil and gas reserves 
beneath them.175 A map also shows how slender China’s claims are— 
the Spratlys are a long way from China.176 China, however, bases its 
claims on history, not geography. China reinforced its claims in July 
2012, by resolving to garrison troops on one of the islands and appoint-
ing forty-five legislators to govern them.177 Likewise, in mid-2012, China 
established a military garrison on the Paracel Islands in the South 
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China Sea, which are claimed by Vietnam.178 This was described by one 
of Australia’s most perspicacious commentators as “an extraordinary 
act of provocation”.179 
 Formerly, China would have sought oil and gas exploration rights 
over the Spratlys and the Paracels by offering the Philippines and Viet-
nam production-sharing agreements plus large amounts of aid and 
hefty, cheap loans.180 Today China bases its claims not on persuasion 
and largesse, but on military might.181 China will prevail by relying on 
its military strength, but at what cost to its longer-term ambitions to be 
a genuine regional and global leader, and to start to shape the global 
system so that it serves China’s, and East Asia’s, ends? 
 In the East China Sea there is an even more potent territorial dis-
pute over the Diaoyu Islands (which are known as the Senkakus in Ja-
pan) and fishing rights in nearby waters.182 In the words of an article 
on Xinhuanet, 
 There is ample historical evidence to show that the Diaoyu 
Islands have been Chinese territory since the Ming Dynasty 
(1368–1644). The fact is recorded in many historical docu-
ments. Even a map published by Japan between 1783 and 
1785 . . . labelled the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory. 
 The islands were unfortunately seized by Japan during the 
1894–1895 Sino-Japanese war and had since been under its 
occupation until its defeat at the end of World War II. 
 However, they were not returned to China, its rightful 
owner, and were wrongly assigned to the then U.S.-controlled 
[Japan] under an illegal treaty signed between Tokyo and 
Washington in 1951.183 
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In contrast, Japan argues that the islands have been under Japanese 
control since 1895, dismissing all of China’s grounds as baseless.184 This 
dispute over five uninhabited islands, which comprise a total area of 
about seven square kilometers and three barren rocks, in reality con-
cerns the nearby important shipping routes and the likelihood of sub-
stantial underground oil reserves.185 This conflict generated consider-
able heat in late 2012 and was beginning to pose a genuine threat to 
regional stability.186 
 There have been extensive protests within China about Japan’s 
occupation of these islands.187 Most Chinese scholars to whom I have 
spoken are of the view that the government could do much to lower 
these tensions and diffuse the situation.188 Yet, as the words of Xin-
huanet quoted above suggest, the Chinese government, for its own rea-
sons, is not seeking to do so.189 One of these reasons may be the strate-
gic significance of the location of these islands as sea lanes that link 
China to the world.190 Yet China is well able to secure its sea lanes with 
its burgeoning navy.191 
 Throughout the George W. Bush administration, the United States 
largely ignored East Asia and fixated on the Middle East.192 Upon com-
ing to power in 2009, the Obama administration sought to rectify this 
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oversight.193 Conventional wisdom posited, however, that the region’s 
resentment of America would make it near impossible for it to reclaim 
its former influence.194 
 Yet, of late, China’s aggressive postures have so scared regional na-
tions that they have been lining up to ask America to re-engage.195 So 
we see the Philippines asking America to re-open Clark Air Base and 
Subic Bay—military bases the Filipinos ordered closed over twenty years 
ago.196 We see the United States announcing its intention to move the 
bulk of its navy to the Pacific, so that 60 percent of its fleet, including 
six aircraft carrier groups, will be based in the Pacific by 2020.197 And 
we see Indonesia taking the unprecedented step of sending its newest 
Sukhoi fighter aircraft offshore, for the first time ever, to Australia for 
joint training exercises in July 2012.198 Thus, of late, China has gifted to 
the United States the opportunity to re-establish its regional credibility 
and influence. But why would China do such a thing? 199 
 The answer to this question may lie not in what China expects the 
results of its actions to be, but in what is motivating its actions. In the 
decades when China’s foreign relations policies were a model of the 
subtle but effective pursuit of national self-interest, China sought re-
gional influence and supporters in global fora.200 It was not, however, 
dealing with issues of territoriality.201 When China’s foreign relations 
policies have tended to be self-defeating, they have dealt with claims to 
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territory seen by China as traditionally belonging to China.202 And here 
the idea, or self-concept, of China becomes very important. Just as I 
wrote earlier, while the idea of Asia is not particularly strong, the idea 
of China is both powerful and resonant for Chinese people.203 
 Consequently, when nations contest China’s ownership of territory 
that it perceives as a traditional part of its identity, China reacts aggres-
sively, and at times in ways that may be quite averse to its interests.204 
These seemingly aggressive actions are nevertheless viewed within 
China as inadequate or even weak.205 For what appears to be at stake is 
not just a small collection of islands, even with potential oil and gas re-
serves—what is at stake is China’s historical identity.206 It is the idea of 
China as the central kingdom, China as mother of the world’s most 
populous people, China as the “moral guardian” of her people in Con-
fucian terms.207 This is partially why China treats people as nationals 
who, although born in China, later renounced their Chinese citizen-
ship in favor of another.208 It also explains why the Chinese national 
and provincial governments first embraced foreign investments from 
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the overseas Chinese under the Deng Xiaoping opening-up, but were 
far less welcoming of investments from non-Chinese.209 
 Important insights into this idea can be gleaned from a speech 
delivered by Professor Wei-Wei Zhang in the Netherlands in 2011. He 
writes: 
China is a civilisational state and the world’s only civilisational 
state. China is the only country in the world with a history of 
unified state for over 2000 years. It is the only country with a 
continuous civilisation lasting over 5000 years. The Chinese 
are the indigenous people to their own land. An example of 
this is the Chinese language: a well-educated higher school 
student . . . can read Confucius’ texts written 2500 years ago, a 
sign of the continuity of Chinese cultural lineage. China is the 
only country which is . . . an amalgamation of an ancient civi-
lisation and a huge model state.210 
Professor Zhang sees China as similar to what the Roman Empire might 
have been had it endured to the present day as a massive unified state 
in which all inhabitants spoke Latin.211 He sees China as an amalgama-
tion of four factors: a super large population, a super-sized territory, a 
super long history, and a super-rich culture. 
 As Nobel laureate, Amartya Sen, has identified: 
[H]igh technology in the world of 1000 AD included paper 
and printing, the crossbow and gunpowder, the clock, the 
iron chain suspension bridge, the kite, the magnetic compass, 
the wheelbarrow and the rotary fan. Each one of these exam-
ples of high technology . . . a millennium ago was well-
established and extensively used in China and . . . practically 
unknown elsewhere.212 
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Most people in the West are unaware that China gave these inventions 
to the world 1,000 years ago and subsequently led the world in tech-
nology, but this is common knowledge in China.213 Indeed, many edu-
cated Chinese people are aware that as recently as 1820, China pro-
duced 33 percent of global GDP214 In 1820, China’s GDP was 42 
percent higher than Western Europe’s and over eighteen times that of 
the United States; further, East and South Asia’s GDP combined was 2.5 
times that of Western Europe.215 China was a superpower before, a fact 
about which the Chinese people are highly aware. They believe “the 
rise of China is granted by nature,” and China’s decline “is a historical 
mistake which they should correct.”216 Indeed, these perspectives are 
equally applicable to India because from the year 1000 to 1820 China 
and India together accounted for one-half of global output, and even 
more than this in the first millennium.217 
 For most Chinese people, the period from 1820 to 1950 was an 
historical anomaly—a period in which Asia was not the most productive 
part of the planet.218 For these people, the economic rise of China is 
merely the world returning to its natural state. 
 In short, China is an idea that is at once larger, more influential, 
and more powerful than the ideas that underpin almost any other na-
tion. Ironically, probably the only other nation in the world that is de-
fined and influenced by its own idea of itself is the other member of the 
G2—the United States. 
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 The power and resonance of this idea of China is why the nation is 
behaving so counter-productively over the territorial disputes in the 
South China and East China seas.219 Thus, any resolution of these con-
flicts must accommodate the present-day reality and influence of this 
idea. China needs to view its interests through a larger lens than sover-
eignty alone. China’s best interests may well be served by recognizing 
and prioritizing its pivotal role as a world super-power above its histori-
cal ideas of its geographical ambit.220 
  A clear pattern has emerged—when China seeks to gain access to 
resources or influence with other nations, it behaves adroitly and sub-
tlety.221 Yet when the issue at stake concerns China’s territorial sover-
eignty, the subtlety gives way entirely to bellicosity.222 This regional ag-
gression would seem to work against China’s national interests.223 
China’s former course of building its soft power and trustworthiness 
was far better calculated to advance its own interests.224 In contrast, 
China’s recent actions have unintentionally increased America’s influ-
ence in the region far more than anyone believed possible three or 
four years ago.225 
 China’s new aggressive posture on security issues also effectively 
derails any possibility of a unified voice on economic governance is-
sues.226 By driving Japan and Korea ever more strongly under the 
American military umbrella, China inevitably gives the United States 
the power to shape Japanese and Korean positions on economic issues 
to an extent otherwise not possible. 
 This outcome is to everybody’s detriment. The G20 would be a 
more effective institution of global economic governance if it had a 
strong and unified policy input from East Asia.227 The region with the 
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highest growth rates in the world must have useful insights on global 
economic issues and needs to be heard. The capacity to bring this to 
fruition lies in China’s hands. This is going to require many years of 
careful, considerate regional behavior, however, as China convinces the 
region it has the region’s best interests at heart and can be trusted to 
deliver to it prosperity and security. 
Conclusion 
 East Asia’s economic strength and stability should give rise to con-
siderable economic clout in G20 deliberations, but for this to happen 
the region must speak with one voice. The two principal reasons it 
doesn’t are: (1) the lingering, potent historical animosities between 
China and Japan and Korea and Japan, respectively, and (2) the re-
gion’s concerns about China’s military rise and its increasing bellicosity. 
So the way forward is going to require action from Japan and China. 
 As previously considered, the only answer to the potent historical 
distrust is for Japan to take responsibility for its history, give uncondi-
tional apologies for past abuses, and ensure its school texts and other 
histories don’t whitewash Japan’s role as the aggressor, and the abuses 
committed by its troops, during World War II. 
 To address the rising concerns about China’s current aggression, 
China similarly must stop resorting to threats and military intimidation; 
otherwise, security tensions will continue to irreparably undermine any 
convergence of the region’s economic voice. China is paying a huge 
price in lost international influence for taking its utterly uncompromis-
ing stance on territorial issues. This is a real loss for the region, which is 
destabilized and spends much more than it would otherwise need to on 
military expenditures. It is a tragedy for China, Japan, and Korea who 
spend their energy squabbling amongst themselves rather than shaping 
the international regulatory, economic, and other agendas in ways that 
would serve them and the region. 
 Since welcoming foreign investment under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping, China’s strategies have been characterized by subtle, astute, 
long-term thinking—three elements missing from its current approach 
on territorial issues. A return by China to its former policies of seeking 
regional leadership and influence through soft power and the strategic 
use of aid funds and largesse may require China to share the oil and gas 
resources in the South China Sea. This cost, however, is minimal com-
pared to the cos1t of the lost opportunity to shape the global economic 
and regulatory agenda. 
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 China is now a major global player. It is playing for stakes far 
higher than access to some oil and gas, especially when, with some 
adroit diplomacy, access to most of this oil and gas can be achieved at 
simply a higher monetary cost. China’s rise has come about breathtak-
ingly quickly, and there is no reason to assume that it is any easier for 
the Chinese leadership to adjust to these seismic changes in global 
power relations than it is for the American or other national leader-
ships to do so. In many ways, this must be more difficult for the Chinese 
leadership because their major challenges (inequality and corruption) 
are essentially domestic, massive, and pressing. Nonetheless, China and 
East Asia would be far better off if each could realize that the bigger 
game they are playing in is the opportunity to shape the global eco-
nomic and financial architecture. It is as if China and East Asia are sud-
denly competing at the Olympics, yet still strategizing as if competing in 
the local athletics competition. 
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